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Abstract
In this paper we argue for a paradigmatic shift from ‘reduction-
ism’ to ‘togetherness’. In particular, we show how interaction between
systems in quantum theory naturally carries over to modelling how
word meanings interact in natural language. Since meaning in natural
language, depending on the subject domain, encompasses discussions
within any scientific discipline, we obtain a template for theories such
as social interaction, animal behaviour, and many others.
1 ...in the beginning was b
No physicists! ...the symbol b above does not stand for the operation that
turns two Hilbert spaces into the smallest Hilbert space in which the two
given ones bilinearly embed. No category-theoreticians! ...neither does it
stand for the composition operation that turns any pair of objects (and
morphisms) in a monoidal category into another object, and that is sub-
ject to a horrendous bunch of conditions that guaranty coherence with the
remainder of the structure. Instead, this is what it means:
b ” “togetherness”
More specifically, it represents the togetherness of foo1 and foo2 without
giving any specification of who/what foo1 and foo2 actually are. Differently
put, it’s the new stuff that emerges when foo1 and foo2 get together. If they
don’t like each other at all, this may be a fight. If they do like each other a
lot, this may be a marriage, and a bit later, babies. Note that togetherness
is vital for the emergence to actually take place, given that it is quite hard
to either have a fight, a wedding, or a baby, if there is nobody else around.
It is of course true that in von Neumann’s formalisation of quantum
theory the tensor product of Hilbert spaces (also denoted by b) plays this
role [39], giving rise to the emergent phenomenon of entanglement [20, 36].
And more generally, in category theory one can axiomatise composition of
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objects (again denoted by b) within a symmetric monoidal category [5],
giving rise to elements that don’t simply arise by pairing, just like in the
case of the Hilbert space tensor product.
However, in the case of von Neumann’s formalisation of quantum theory
we are talking about a formalisation which, despite being widely used, its
creator von Neumann himself didn’t even like [33]. Moreover, in this formal-
ism b only arises as a secondary construct, requiring a detailed description
of foo1 and foo2, whose togetherness it describes. What we are after is
a ‘foo-less’ conception of b. The composition operation b in symmetric
monoidal categories heads in that direction. However, by making an unnec-
essary commitment to set-theory, it makes things unnecessarily complicated
[16]. Moreover, while this operation is general enough to accommodate to-
getherness, it doesn’t really tell us anything about it.
The title of this section is a metaphor aimed at confronting the complete
disregard that the concept of togetherness has suffered in the sciences, and
especially, in physics, where all of the effort has been on describing the in-
dividual, typically by breaking its description down to that of even smaller
individuals. While, without any doubt, this has been a useful endeavour,
it unfortunately has evolved in a rigid doctrine, leaving no space for any-
thing else. The most extreme manifestation of this dogma is the use of the
term ‘theory of everything’ in particle physics. We will provide an alterna-
tive conceptual template for a theory of everything, supported not only by
scientific examples, but also by everyday ones.
Biology evolved from chopping up individual animals in laboratories, to
considering them in the context of other other animals and varying envi-
ronments. the result is the theory of evolution of species. Similarly, our
current (still very poor) understanding of the human brain makes it clear
that the human brain should not be studied as something in isolation, but
as something that fundamentally requires interaction with other brains [30].
In contemporary audio equipment, music consists of nothing but a strings
of zeros and ones. Instead, the entities that truly make up music are pitch,
sound, rhythm, chord progression, crescendo, and so on. And in particu-
lar, music is not just a bag of these, since their intricate interaction is even
more important than these constituents themselves. The same is true for
film, where it isn’t even that clear what it is made up from, but it does
include such things as (easily replaceable) actors, decors, cameras, which all
are part of a soup stirred by a director. But again, in contemporary video
equipment, it is nothing but a string of zeros and ones.
In fact, everything that goes on in pretty much all modern devices is
nothing but zeros and ones. While it was Turing’s brilliance to realise that
this could in fact be done, and provided a foundation for the theory of
computability [38], this is in fact the only place where the zeros and ones are
truly meaningful, in the form of a Turing machine. Elsewhere, it is nothing
but a (universal) representation, with no conceptual qualities regarding the
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subject matter.
2 Formalising togetherness 1: not there yet
So, how does one go about formalising the concept of togetherness? While
we don’t want an explicit description of the foo involved, we do need some
kind of means for identifying foo. Therefore, we simple give each foo a name,
say A,B,C, . . .. Then, Ab B represents the togetherness of A and B. We
also don’t want an explicit description of AbB, so how can we say anything
about b without explicitly describing A, B and AbB?
Well, rather than describing these systems themselves, we could describe
their relationships. For example, in a certain theory togetherness could obey
the following equation:
AbA “ A
That is, togetherness of two copies of something is exactly the same as a
single copy, or in simpler terms, one is as good as two. For example, if one
is in need of a plumber to fix a pipe, one only needs one. The only thing
a second plumber would contribute is a bill for the time he wasted coming
to your house. Obviously, this is not the kind of togetherness that we are
really interested in, given that this kind adds nothing at all.
A tiny bit more interesting is the case that two is as good as three:
AbAbA “ AbA
e.g. when something needs to be carried on a staircase, but there really is
only space for two people to be involved. Or, when A is female and A¯ is
male, and the goal is reproduction, we have:
Ab A¯b A¯ “ Ab A¯
(ignoring testosterone induced scuffles and the benefits of natural selection.)
We really won’t get very far this manner. One way in which things can
be improved is by replacing equations by inequalities. For example, while:
A “ B
simply means that one of the two is redundant, instead:
A ď B
can mean that from A we can produce B, and:
AbB ď C
can mean that from A and B together we can produce C, and:
Ab C ď B b C
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can mean that in the presence of C from A we can produce B, i.e. that C
is a catalyst.
What we have now is a so-called resource theory, that is, a theory which
captures how stuff we care about can be interconverted [13]. Resource the-
ories allow for quantitative analysis, for example, in terms of a conversion
rate:
rpAÑ Bq :“ sup
#
m
n
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ Ab . . .bAloooooomoooooon
n
ď B b . . .bBloooooomoooooon
m
+
So evidently we have some genuine substance now.1
3 Formalising togetherness 2: that’s better
But we can still do a lot better. What a resource theory fails to capture
(on purpose in fact) is the actual process that converts one resource into
another one. So let’s fix that problem, and explicitly account for processes.
In terms of togetherness, this means that we bring the fun foo1 and foo2
can have together explicitly in the picture. Let:
f : AÑ B
denote some process that transforms A into B.Then, given two such pro-
cesses f1 and f2 we can also consider their togetherness:
f1 b f2 : A1 bA2 Ñ B1 bB2
Moreover, some processes can be sequentially chained:
g ˝ f : AÑ B Ñ C
We say ‘some’, since f has to produce B, in order for:
g : B Ñ C
to take place.
Now, here one may end up in a bit of a mess if one isn’t clever. In
particular, with a bit of thinking one quickly realises that one wants some
equations to be obeyed, for example:
pf1 b f2q b f3 “ f1 b pf2 b f3q (1)
h ˝ pg ˝ fq “ ph ˝ gq ˝ f (2)
1In fact, resource theories are currently a very active area of research in the quantum
information and quantum foundations communities, e.g. the resource theories of entangle-
ment [23], symmetry [21], and athermality [7].
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and a bit more sophisticated, also:
pg1 b g2q ˝ pf1 b f2q “ pg1 ˝ f1q b pg2 ˝ f2q (3)
There may even be some more equations that one wants to have, but which
ones? This turns out to be a very difficult problem. Too difficult in the light
of our limited existence in this world. The origin of this problem is that we
treat b, and also ˝, as algebraic connectives, and that algebra has its roots
in set-theory. The larger-than-life problem can be avoided in a manner that
is equally elegant as it is simple.
To state that things are together, we just write them down together:
A B
There really is no reason to adjoin the symbol b between them. Now, this A
and B will play the role of an input or an output of processes transforming
them. Therefore, it will be useful to represent them by a wire:
BA
Then, a process transforming A into B can be represented by a box:
f
A
B
Togetherness of processes now becomes:
f1 f2
and chaining processes becomes:
f
g
In particular, equations (1), (2) and (3) become:
f
g
h
g
h
f
“f1 “
g1
f1
g2
f2 f1
g1
f2
g2
“
f2 f3 f1 f2 f3
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That is, all equations have become tautologies!2
4 Anti-cartesian togetherness
One important kind of processes are states:
s
These are depicted without any inputs, where ‘no wire’ can be read as
‘nothing’ (or ‘no-foo’).3 The opposite notion is that of an effect, that is,
a process without an output:
e
borrowing terminology from quantum theory.4
We can now identify those theories in which togetherness doesn’t yield
anything new. Life in such a world is pretty lonely...
Definition 4.1. A theory of togetherness is cartesian if each state:
BA
s
decomposes as follows:
BA
s
“ s1 s2
A B
So cartesianness means that all possible realisations of two foo-s can be
achieved by pairing realisations of the individual foo-s involved. In short, a
whole can be described in term of its parts, rendering togetherness a void
concept. So very lonely and indeed... But, wait a minute. Why is it then the
case that so much of traditional mathematics follows this cartesian template,
and that even category theory for a long time has followed a strict cartesian
stance? Beats me. Seriously...beats me!
Anyway, an obvious consequence of this is that for those areas where
togetherness is a genuinely non-trivial concept, traditional mathematical
structures aren’t always that useful. That is maybe why social sciences
don’t make much use of any kind of modern pure mathematics.
And now for something completely different:
2A more extensive discussion of this bit of magic can be found in [16, 12, 15].
3That we use triangles for these rather than boxes is inspired by the Dirac notation
which is used in quantum theory. Please consult [10, 16, 15] for a discussion.
4Examples of these include ‘tests’ [15].
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Definition 4.2. A theory of togetherness is anti-cartesian if for each A
there exists A˚, a special state Y and a special effect X:
AA˚
Y and
A˚A
X
which are such that the following equation holds:
X
A˚
Y
“ A
A
A
(4)
The reason for ‘anti’ in the name of this kind of togetherness is the fact
that when a theory of togetherness is both cartesian and anti-cartesian, then
it is nothing but a theory of absolute death, i.e. it describes a world in which
nothing ever happens. Indeed, we have:
“
Y1 Y2
X
Y
“
X
“
Y2
Y1
X
cartesiananti-cartesian
“
Y2
t
That is, the identity is a constant process, always outputting the state Y2,
independent of what the input is. And if that isn’t weird enough, any
arbitrary process f does the same:
“
f
“
f
Y2
t
Y2
t1
f “
Therefore, any anti-cartesian theory of togetherness that involves some as-
pect of change cannot be cartesian, and hence will have interesting stuff
emerging from togetherness.5
5 Example 1: quantum theory
Anti-cartesian togetherness is a very particular alternative to cartesian to-
getherness (contra any theory that fails to be cartesian). So one may wonder
5Many more properties of anti-cartesian togetherness can be found in [15].
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whether there are any interesting examples. And yes, there are! One ex-
ample is quantum entanglement in quantum theory. That is in fact where
the author’s interest in anti-cartesian togetherness started [9, 1, 10].6 As
shown in these papers, equation (4) pretty much embodies the phenomenon
of quantum teleportation [6]. The full-blown description of quantum tele-
portation goes as follows [17, 18, 15]:
ρ
pU
Alice Bob
pU
Alice’s measurement
Bob’s unitary correction
classical communication
state to be teleported
shared Bell-state
It is not important to fully understand the details here. What is important
is to note that the bit of this diagram corresponding to equation (4) is the
bold wire which zig-zags through it:
Y
X
The thin wires and the boxes labelled pU are related to the fact that quantum
theory is non-deterministic. By conditioning on particular measurement
outcomes, teleportation simplifies to [15]:
6Independently, similar insights appeared in [3, 26].
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ρAlice Bob
“
Alice Bob
ρ
state to be teleported
shared Bell-state
Alice’s (conditioned) measurement state now with Bob
Equality of the left-hand-side and of the right-hand-side follows directly from
equation (4). While in this picture we eliminated quantum non-determinism
by conditioning on a measurement outcome, there still is something very
‘quantum’ going on here: Alice’s (conditioned) measurement is nothing like a
passive observation, but a highly non-trivial intervention that makes Alice’s
state ρ appear at Bob’s side:
ρ
Alice Bob
ρ
Alice Bob
ÞÑ
Let’s analyse more carefully what’s going on here by explicitly distin-
guishing the top layer and the bottom layer of this diagram:
ρ
top
bottom
The bottom part:
ρ
consists of the state ρ together with a special Y-state, while the top part:
includes the corresponding X-effect, as well as an output. By making the
bottom part and the top part interact, and, in particular, the Y and the X,
the state ρ ends up at the output of the top part.
A more sophisticated variation on the same theme makes it much clearer
which mechanism is going on here. Using equation (4), the diagram:
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piρ ρ2ρ1
reduces to:
pi
ρ ρ2
ρ1 where ρ
1 :“ ρ1
The grey dot labeled pi is some (at this point not important) unitary quan-
tum operation [15]. Let us again consider the bottom and top parts:
piρ ρ2ρ1
bottom
top
The top part is a far more sophisticated measurement consisting mainly of
X-s. Also the bottom part is a lot more sophisticated, involving many Y-s.
These now cause a highly non-trivial interaction of the three states ρ, ρ1
and ρ2. Why we have chosen this particular example will become clear in
the next section. What is important to note is that the overall state and
overall effect have to be chosen in a very particular way to create the desired
interaction, similarly to an old-fashion telephone switchboard that has to be
connected in a very precise manner in order to realise the right connection.
6 Example 2: natural language meaning
Another example of anti-cartesian togetherness is the manner in which word
meanings interact in natural language! Given that logic originated in natural
language, when Aristotle analysed arguments involving ‘and’, ‘if...then’, ‘or’,
etc., anti-cartesianness can be conceived as some new kind of logic!7 So what
are Y and X in this context?
In order to understand what X is, we need to understand the mathe-
matics of grammar. The study of the mathematical structure of grammar
has indicated that the fundamental things making up sentences are not the
7A more detailed discussion is in [11].
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words, but some atomic grammatical types, such as the noun-type and the
sentence-type [2, 4, 27]. The transitive verb-type is not an atomic gram-
matical type, but a composite made up of two noun-types and one sentence-
type. Hence, particularly interesting here is that atomic doesn’t really mean
smallest...
On the other hand, just like in particle physics where we have particles
and anti-particles, the atomic types include types as well as anti-types. But
unlike in particle physics, there are two kinds of anti-types, namely left
ones and right ones. This makes language even more non-commutative than
quantum theory!
All of this becomes much clearer when considering an example. Let n
denote the atomic noun-type and let ´1n and n´1 be the corresponding
anti-types. Let s denote the atomic sentence-type. Then the non-atomic
transitive verb-type is ´1n ¨ s ¨n´1. Intuitively, it is easy to understand why.
Consider a transitive verb, like ‘hate’. Then, simply saying ‘hate’ doesn’t
convey any useful information, until, we also specify ‘whom’ hates ‘whom’.
That’s exactly the role of the anti-types: they specify that in order to form
a meaningful sentence, a noun is needed on the left, and a noun is needed
on the right:
Alicelomon
n
hateslomon
´1
n¨s¨n
´1
Boblomon
n
Then, n and ´1n cancel out, and so do n´1 and n. What remains is s,
confirming that ‘Alice hates Bob’ is a grammatically well-typed sentence.
We can now depict the cancelations as follows:
n ns nn -1-1
n and ´1n cancel out n´1 and n cancel out
s is sole survivor
and bingo, we found X!
While the mathematics of sentence structure has been explored now for
some 80 years, the fact that X-s can account for grammatical structure is
merely a 15 years old idea [28]. So what are the Y-s? That is an even
more recent story in which we were involved, and in fact, for which we took
inspiration from the story of the previous section [8]. While X-s are about
grammar, Y-s are about meaning.
The distributional paradigm for natural language meaning states that
meaning can be represented by vectors in a vector space [37]. Until recently,
grammatical structure was essentially ignored in doing so, and in particular,
there was no theory for how to compute the meaning of a sentence, given
the meanings of its words. Our new compositional distributional model of
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meaning of [19] does exactly that.8
In order to explain how this compositional distributional model of mean-
ing works, let’s get back to our example. Since we have grammatical types
around, the meaning vectors should respect grammatical structure, that
is, the vectors representing compound types should themselves live in com-
pound vector spaces. So the string of vectors representing the word meanings
of our example would look as follows:
A Bhates
Now we want to put forward a new hypothesis:
Grammar is all about how word meanings interact.
Inspired by the previous section, this can be realised as follows:
A Bhates
where the X-s are now interpreted in exactly the same manner as in the
previous section. And here is a more sophisticated example:
piA Blike
meanings
grammar
does not
where the pi-labeled grey circle should now be conceived as negating meaning
[19]. The grammatical structure is here:
nn -1 n-1nσ-1σ -1σσs j j-1j j-1
It is simply taken from a textbook such as [29], the meanings of Alice,
likes and Bob can be automatically generated from some corpus, while the
meanings of does and not are just cleverly chosen to be [32, 19]:
pi
8...and has meanwhile outperformed other attempts in several benchmark natural lan-
guage processing (NLP) tasks [22, 25].
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In the previous section we already saw that in this way we obtain:
pi
A B
like
not
This indeed captures the intended meaning:
not plike pAlice,Bobqq
where we can think of like as being a predicate and not as being itself.
So an interesting new aspect of the last example is that some of the
meaning vectors of words are simply cleverly chosen, and in particular, in-
volve Y-s. Hence, we genuinely exploit full-blown anti-cartesianess. What
anti-cartesianess does here is making sure that the transitive verb likes ‘re-
ceives’ Alice as its object. Note also how not does pretty much the same
as does, guiding word meanings through the sentence, with, of course, one
very important additional task: negating the sentence meaning.
The cautious reader must of course have noticed that in the previous
section we used thick wires, while here we used thin ones. Also, the dots in
the full-blown description of quantum teleportation, which represent classi-
cal data operations, have vanished in this section. Meanwhile, thick wires as
well as the dots all of these have acquired a vary natural role in a more re-
fined model of natural language meaning. The dots allow to cleverly choose
the meanings of relative pronouns [34, 35]:
She hates
who
B
Thick wires (representing density matrices, rather than vectors [15]) allow
to encode word ambiguity as mixedness [31, 24]. For example, the different
meanings of the word queen (a rock band, a person, a bee, a chess piece, or
a drag —). Mixedness vanishes when providing a sufficient string of words
that disambiguates that meaning, e.g.:
queen stings rocksqueen to C4queen
while in the case of:
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rulesqueen
we need more disambiguating words, since queen can still refer to a person,
a rock band, as well as a drag queen.
7 Meaning is everything
The distributional model of meaning [37] is very useful in that it allows for
automation, given a substantially large corpus of text. However, from a
conceptual point of view it is far from ideal. So one may ask the question:
What is meaning?
One may try to play around with a variety of mathematical structures.
The method introduced in [19] doesn’t really depend on how one models
meaning, as long as we stick to anti-cartesian togetherness, or something
sufficiently closely related [14]. It is an entertaining exercise to play around
with the idea of what possibly could be the ultimate mathematical structure
that captures meaning in natural language, until one realises that meaning
in natural language truly encompasses everything. Indeed, we use language
to talk about everything, e.g. logic, life, biology, physics, social behaviours,
politics, so the ultimate model of meaning should encompass all of these
fields. So, a theory of meaning in natural language is actually a theory of
everything! Can we make sense of the template introduced in the previous
section for meaning in natural language, as one for ... everything?
Let us first investigate, whether the general distributional paradigm can
be specialised to the variety of subject domains mentioned above. The man-
ner in which the distributional model works, is that meanings are assigned
relative to a fixed chosen set of context words. The meaning vector of any
word then arises by counting the number of occurrences of that word in the
close neighbourhood of each of the context words, within a large corpus of
text. One can think of the context words as attributes, and the relative fre-
quencies as the relevance of an attribute for the word. Simply by specialising
the context words and the corpus, one can specialise to a certain subject do-
main. For example, if one is interested in social behaviours then the corpus
could consist of social networking sites, and the context words could be cho-
sen accordingly. This pragmatic approach allows for quantitative analysis,
just like the compositional distributional model of [19].
Here’s another example:
lion prayhunts
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Here the meaning of pray could include specification of the available pray,
and then the meaning of the sentence would capture the survival success of
the lion, given the nature of the available pray. All together, the resulting
meaning is the result of the interaction between a particular hunter, a par-
ticular pray, and the intricacies of the hunting process, which may depend
on the particular environment in which it is taking place. It should be clear
that again this situation is radically non-cartesian.
Of course, if we now consider the example of quantum theory from two
sections ago, the analogues to grammatical types are system types i.e. a
specification of the kinds (incl. quantity) of systems that are involved. So it
makes sense to refine the grammatical types according to the subject domain.
Just like nouns in physics would involve specification of the kinds of systems
involved, in biology, for example, this could involve specification of species,
population size, environment, availability of food etc. Correspondingly, the
top part would not just be restricted to grammatical interaction, but also
domain specific interaction, just like in the case of quantum theory. All
together, what we obtain is the following picture:
pix zy
interaction structure
data/descriptions of relevant entities
types
as a (very rough) template for a theory of everything.
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